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Abstract 
Remote user authentication is one of the most commonly used mechanisms to verify the legitimacy of a remote user over 
insecure communication channel. In remote user authentication, the server and the user mutually authenticate each other and 
establish a common session key for future communication. In this paper, we propose a secure and effective two-factor remote 
user authentication scheme based on RSA, which achieves mutual authentication and user anonymity properties. Informal 
security analysis ensures that the proposed scheme is secure against various malicious attacks and its security is based on the one-
way hash function, smart card, and RSA algorithm. Performance comparison shows that the proposed scheme is efficient in terms 
of communication and computation overhead. Furthermore we demonstrate the validity of our proposed through BAN logic, 
which confirm that the proposed scheme achieve mutual authentication and session key agreement securely.  
 
 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most convenient and well popular two factor authentication scheme is based on smart card and 
password. It has been extensively used in different types of applications such as remote host login, e-banking, online 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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pay-TV, e-commerce, online bill payment, e-rail, etc. In order to access these application servers, a mutual 
authentication and key agreement scheme is needed, in which the remote server and the user mutually authenticate 
each other and generate a common session key. In 1981, Lamport proposed the first remote authentication scheme 
based on smart card [1]. However, in their scheme the server must store a password list and consequently cannot 
resist the interpolation attack. After that, many password authentication schemes have been proposed to improve the 
scheme security and enhance their functionality [2-8].  
In 1999 Yang et al. proposed an authentication scheme based on RSA cryptosystem [5]. However, Chan et al. [6] 
show that Yang et al. scheme is not secure and vulnerable to impersonation attack. In 2002, Fan et al. [7] also prove 
that Yang et al. scheme could not withstand user impersonation attack and proposed a slight modification to resist 
this attack. In 2003, Shen et al. [8] proposed a modified Yang et. al scheme to enhance security. This scheme could 
withstand the impersonation attack and also provide mutual authentication. In recent years, many RSA based 
authentication scheme have been proposed by researcher [9-12] .The security of RSA cryptosystem is based on the 
difficulty of factoring large prime integers. In this paper, we propose a two-factor remote user authentication scheme 
with user anonymity based on RSA that provides mutual authentication with key agreement. In addition, we use 
BAN logic to demonstrate the validity of the proposed scheme. Our scheme precisely comprises of the following 
merits: (1) It has an efficient login phase, where an incorrect input can be quickly detected. (2) It has an efficient and 
user friendly password change phase where user can change his password without server assistant. (3) It provides 
user anonymity. (4) It supports mutual authentication and session key agreement. (5) The computation cost and 
communication cost are comparable with other relevant schemes. (6) It satisfies all desired security attributes. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we describe our proposed scheme. The formal and 
informal security analysis is presented in section 3. The functionality and performance comparison among the 
proposed scheme and other relevant schemes demonstrate in section 4. Finally the conclusion of our proposed 
scheme is described in section 5. 
2. Proposed Scheme 
Our scheme has five phases: initialization phase, registration phase, login phase, authentication and key 
agreement phase, and password change phase. 
2.1. Initialization Phase 
In this phase, the remote server S chooses the system parameters. For this purpose, the remote server S generate 
two large prime numbers p and q and compute n= pൈq. The public key e is chosen randomly such that 1൏  ൏ 
׎ሺሻand gcd (e,׎ሺሻሻ ൌ1, where ׎ሺሻ= (p- 1)ൈ (q-1). The private key is computed as d= െͳ mod ׎ሺሻ where d 
is multiplicative inverse of e mod ׎ሺሻ.The remote server publish {e, n} as public key and {d, p, q} as private key. 
 
2.2. Registration Phase 
When a new user  wants to registers or re-registers in the remote server, he/she chooses identity   , password 
  and generates a random number r and computes RPW= h(ԡ).Then the user sends registration request 
message ( , RPW) to the server S via a secure channel. After receiving the registration request message from the 
user , the server S computes MK=h(  ԡd), L= MKْRPW, B= h(MKԡRPW), J=   mod n and Y= J ْB. 
Then the server sends a smart card containing the information {ǡ ǡ ሺǤ ሻǡ ǡ } to the user Ui through secure 
channel. After receiving the smart card securely from the server S, the user stores a random number r in the memory 
of the smart card. Finally the smart card contain {ǡ ǡ ሺǤ ሻǡ ǡ , r} and the registration phase is successfully 
completed. 
 
2.3 Login Phase 
Whenever a user wants to access the remote servers, he/she inserts the smart card into the smart card reader and 
enters his   and . Smart card computes Ԣ= h(ԡ r), Ԣ  =Lْ Ԣ ,Ԣ ൌ ሺԢ ԡԢሻ, Ԣ=Jْ
ْ Ԣ  and̶ ൌ mod n and checks whether ̶ equals to entered   or not. If they are not equal, the session is 
terminated by the smart card. Otherwise, the user is legal owner of smart card. Then the smart card generates a 
random nonce  , computes AID=  ْh(ԡ ),  =h(ԡԡ ),  ൌ ሺԡԡԡሻmod n,  Ԣ =  
ْh(MKԡ) and sends the login request message {AID,, , Ԣ} to the  server S through a public channel. 
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2.4 Authentication and Key agreement Phase 
In this phase, the server and user authenticate each other and generate a session key for future communication by 
performing the following steps. 
 1.After receiving the login request message {AID,, , ′}, the server computes  ൌ  Ԣ ْh(MKԡ) , Ԣ= 
AIDْh(ԡ), Ԣ= h(ԡԡ), Ԣ=ሺԡԡԡሻmod n and ̶= h(ԡ Ԣ ԡԡ).Then server matches 
 Ԣwith the stored   , ̶=  Ԣ  and  Ԣ=. If it does not hold, this phase is terminated immediately, otherwise, the 
server believes that the user is legitimate entity and it generates a random nonce   and computes =h(ԡԡ), 
 Ԣ=   ْh(MKԡ), =ሺԡԡԡԡሻ.Then Server sends (ǡ  Ԣ ,) to the user Ui . 
2. After receiving the authentication message { ǡ  Ԣ ,  } from the  server, the user U computes  ൌ
Ԣْh(MKԡ),  Ԣ ൌሺ ԡԡ) and Ԣ= ሺ Ԣሻ.Then the User matches  ൌ Ԣ and =Ԣ. If 
matched, the user is authenticated to the server and mutual authentication holds good. 
3. Finally the server S and the user U agree upon a common secret session key SK = h(ԡԡԡሻ . 
 
2.5 Password Change Phase 
This phase is invoked when the user wants to change the password, the user inserts his/her smart card into smart 
card reader and keys in {   ,  }.The smart card computes Ԣ = h( ԡ  r),Ԣ  =Lْ Ԣ , Ԣ ൌ
ሺԢ ԡԢሻ,  Ԣ ൌJ ْ ْ Ԣ ,̶ ൌ mod n and checks whether ̶ is equal to entered   or not. If condition 
hold, it means the user is legitimate holder of smart card. Now the user enters his new password   and smart 
card computes  = h( ԡ r),  =Lْ ْ  ,  = Y ْRPWْ  .Then the smart 
card replaces  with   and L with   in its memory. Now the new password successfully updated.  
3. Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme 
3.1. Authentication Proof Based on BAN logic 
BAN logic [16] is one of the most popular and widely used logics, which ensures that the proposed scheme 
achieve mutual authentication and session key agreement securely. To implement BAN logic to prove an 
authentication scheme, the following steps should be performed. 
 
STEP1: We show the verification goals of the proposed scheme as follows: 
 Goal 1: |ؠሺ
 ርۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ሮS) 
 Goal 2: |ؠS|ؠ ሺ
 ርۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ሮS) 
 Goal3:  S|ؠሺ
 ርۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ሮS) 
 Goal4:|ؠ  |ؠሺ
 ርۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ሮS) 
STEP2: We transform our proposed scheme to the idealised form as follows: 
Message1. SioU : AID,  ,ǣ ൏ ǡ ǡ  ൐  , Ԣ  
Message2. UioS : , ǣ ൏ ǡ ǡ ǡ  ൐  ,  Ԣ  
STEP3: We make the following assumption about the initial state of the scheme to analyze the proposed scheme 
ͳ: |ؠ#ሺ,) 
ʹǣ S|ؠ#ሺ ,) 
͵: |ؠ
 ርۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ሮS 
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Ͷ:|ؠ 
 ርۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ሮۛ   
ܣͷ : S ؠ    
͸ :  ؠ   
STEP4: Based on the above-mentioned assumptions and rules of BAN logic, we prove the security of the proposed 
scheme and main procedures of proof as follows: According to the message 1, we obtain: 
ͳ : S ( AID,  , ǣ൏ ǡ ǡ  ൐  , Ԣ ) 
According toͳ, Ͷ and the message meaning rule, we obtain 
ʹ ׷ S|ؠ  |̱( ǡ  ǡ ) 
According to ʹ , we apply the freshness conjuncatenation rule to obtain 
͵ : S|ؠ ͓|( ǡ ǡ ) 
According to ʹ and ͵we apply the nonce verification rule to obtain 
Ͷ : S|ؠ  |ؠ ሺǡ ǡ ) 
According to Ͷ , ͷ and jurisdiction rule, we obtain 
ͷ:  S|ؠ ሺǡ ǡ ) 
According to Ͷ , ʹ and session key rule, we obtain 
͸ : S|ؠሺ
 ርۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ሮS)      Goal 3 
According to ͸ , ʹ and nonce verification rule, we  obtain 
͹ :|ؠ  |ؠሺ
 ርۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ሮS)    Goal4 
According to the message 2, we obtain 
ͺ : Ui ( , ǣ൏ ǡ ǡ ǡ  ൐  ,  Ԣ ) 
According to ͺǡ  ͵ we apply message meaning rule to obtain 
ͻ ׷  |ؠ |̱(  ǡ ǡ ǡ ) 
According to assumption ͳ we apply the freshness conjuncatenation rule to obtain 
ͳͲ :  |ؠ ͓|(  ǡ ǡ  ǡ ) 
According to ͻ and ͳͲwe apply the nonce verification rule to obtain 
ͳͳ :  |ؠS|ؠ ሺǡ ǡ  ǡ ) 
According toͳͳ,  ͸ and jurisdiction rule, we obtain 
ͳʹ:  |ؠ ሺǡ ǡ ǡ ሻ 
According to ͳͳ ǡ ͳ and session key rule, we obtain 
ͳ͵ : |ؠሺ
 ርۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ሮS)      Goal 1 
According toͳ͵,ͳ and nonce verification rule, we obtain 
ͳͶ: |ؠS|ؠ 
 ርۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ሮS)    Goal 2 
3.2 Further Security Analysis and Discussion 
 
Proposition 1: An attacker A from outside of the system gets the user’s smart card and reveals the information 
{ܻǡ ܮǡ ݎ} stored in it, then he will not be able to guess the user’s password and private key d. 
Proof: If by any means the attacker A gets the user’s smart card and extracts the information {ܻǡ ܮǡ ݎ} stored in 
it. We show that the adversary A cannot get user’s identity, password and secret key d as follows: 
1. A has L= MKْRPW= h(ܫܦ݅ԡ d)ْ h(ܲ ܹ݅ԡ r), for a given r. But it is computationally hard to 
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extract identity ܫܦ݅  , password ܲ ܹ݅  and secret key d, from L due to inversion of cryptographic one-
way hash function. Thus, attacker cannot solve one equation for three unknown values. 
2. A has Y=JْB=ܫܦ݅݀mod nْh(MKԡRPW)=ܫܦ݅݀mod nْ ሺh(ܫܦ݅ԡ d)ԡh(ܲ ܹ݅ԡ r)) for given r. But it 
is computationally hard to extract identity ܫܦ݅ , password ܲ ܹ݅  and secret key d, from Y due to inversion 
of cryptographic one way hash function. 
Proposition 2: An attacker A from inside of the system uses his own smart card parameters {ܻǡܮǡ ݎ}, then he 
cannot extract private key d of the server.  
Proof: In this attack model, a legal but malicious user tries to extract the private key d by using his own {ܫܦ݅ , 
ܲ ܹ݅  }and smart card parameters {ܻǡ ܮǡ ݎ}. In the following, we show that the malicious user cannot get the secret 
key d. 
1. A has L= MKْRPW= h(ԡ d )ْ h(ԡ r). But it is computationally hard to extract the secret 
key d from L due to inversion of cryptographic one way hash function. 
2. A has Y= J ْB=ܫܦ݅݀  mod n ْ h(MKԡRPW)=ܫܦ݅݀  mod n ْ ሺ h(ܫܦ݅ԡ d )ԡ h(ܲ ܹ݅ԡ r)). Due to 
factorization problem and inversion of cryptographic function, it is hard to find d from Y. 
Proposition 3: An attacker A from the outside of the system cannot know the user’s identity ܫܦ݅ , server’s private 
key d, random nonce ܴ݅  ݆ܴ , from the login request message {AID,ܥ݅ ,ܸ݅ ,ܴ݅ ′} and reply message {ܧ݅ ǡ ݆ܴ ′, ܸݏ}. 
Proof: In this attack model, the attacker traps the login request message {AID,ܥ݅ ,ܸ݅ ,ܴ݅ ′} and reply message 
{ܧ݅ ǡ ݆ܴ ′, ܸݏ} . We show that the attacker cannot extract user’s identity ܫܦ݅ , private key d, random nonce ܴ݅  ݆ܴ  . 
1. We have AID= IDْh(ܴ݅ԡ) = IDْh(ܴ݅ԡሺܫܦ݅ԡሻ). An attacker has to guess two unknown 
parameters ܴ݅  and d at the same time to get the user’s identity from the above equation, which is 
infeasible. 
2. Similarly, the attacker cannot verify an identity IDi from {ܥ݅  ,ܴ݅ ′} parameters due to the same reason. 
3. From ܸ݅ ൌ ݄ሺܫܦ݅ԡܥ݅ԡܴ݅ԡሻ݁ mod n = ሺܫܦ݅ԡܥ݅ԡܴ݅ԡሺܫܦ݅ԡሻሻ݁  mod n, due to factorization 
problem, it is hard to find d from e. An attacker cannot decode ݄ሺܫܦ݅ԡܥ݅ԡܴ݅ԡሻ݁ mod n from ܸ݅  
without knowing d. Hence the attacker cannot extract user’s identity ܫܦ݅ ,  private key d of the server  
and random nonce ܴ݅ Ǥ 
4. From ܧ݅ =h( ݆ܴ ԡԡܻ)= h( ݆ܴ ԡሺܫܦ݅ԡሻԡܻ). An attacker has to guess two unknown parameters ݆ܴ  
and d at the same time to get the user’s identity from the above equation, which is infeasible.  
5. Similarly, the attacker cannot obtain the identity IDi from { ݆ܴ Ԣ ǡ ܸݏ} parameters due to the same 
reason. 
Proposition 4: An attacker A from the inside of the system cannot know server’s private key d of the server from 
the login request message {AID,, , Ԣ} and reply message {ǡ  Ԣ ,} between the user and server. 
Proof: In this attack model, a legal but malicious user tries to extract the private key d of the sever by 
intercepting the login request message {AID,  , , Ԣ } and reply message {ǡ  Ԣ ,} between the user and 
server. Due to inversion of cryptographic hash function the attacker cannot compute the server’s private key d from 
the message MK=h(ԡ). Hence the proof of proposition 4. 
3.2.1 Resistance to Insider attack 
In real environment, it is common practice that many users use same password to access different servers for 
their convenience. However, if the privileged insider of S has learnt the password of Ui, he may try to impersonate 
Ui by access the other server. In our scheme, Ui registers with S by presenting RPW= h(ܲ ܹ݅ԡ r) instead of h(PWi) or 
PWi. The insider of S cannot directly obtain PWi. Therefore, our scheme is secure against   the insider attack. 
3.2.2  Resistance to password guessing attack 
Proposition 1 and proposition 3 show that an attacker cannot extract or guess the user’s password and secret key 
d using the secret values extracted from the smart card and communication message between user and server. Thus 
our scheme is secure against the password guessing attack. 
3.2.3 Resistance to Replay attack 
An adversary may intercept the previous login request and reply message. Then the attacker can impersonate Ui 
to access the server by sending the intercepted message. However, in each session of our scheme, the user Ui and the 
server Si generate a different random nonce Ri and Rj , respectively. The random nonce ensures that the 
authentication messages are distinct in different sessions and valid for that session only. Therefore our scheme is 
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secure against replay attack.  
3.2.4 Resistance to Forward secrecy attack 
Forward secrecy means that if the master key of the system is compromised, then the secrecy of previously 
established session key should not be affected. In our scheme, if the master key MK and Y are compromised due to 
some reason, the attacker cannot compute the session key without knowing the values of Ri and Rj. Therefore our 
scheme is secure against the forward secrecy attack. 
3.2.5 Resistance to user impersonation and server spoofing attack 
Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4 show that an adversary cannot extract the secret information between the user and 
server. Thus the attacker cannot create valid login request and reply message without knowing the secret 
information between the user and server. Thus our scheme is secure against the user impersonation and server 
spoofing attack. 
3.2.6 Preserving User anonymity 
In our scheme, the user’s anonymity is preserved in each login request. We compute an anonymous identity 
AID= IDْh(ܴ݅ԡ) for the user and this identity is different in each login attempt because it is calculated with the 
random nonce Ri .Only the authentication server knows the secret value MK and ܴ݅ . So only the authenticated server 
can retrieve userǤ  hence, in our scheme, an attacker   cannot identify the person trying to log into the server. 
 
4. Performance evaluation 
In this section we compare security and performance of the proposed scheme with other relevant schemes [13, 
14, 15].In Table 1, we summarized the communication cost and computation cost of the proposed scheme and other 
relevant scheme. The total computation overhead of our scheme is 16݄ܶ +͵ ܶܧ ǡ where ݄ܶ  is time taken in the secure 
one-way hash function and ܶܧ  is time taken in modular exponentiation operation. To analyze the communication 
overhead, we use the following facts and assumptions, identity, password, random nonce and output of secure one-
way function are 160 bit long. One block in AES is 128 bit long and modular exponentiation operation takes 1024 
bits. The communication overhead of our scheme is 160*6+1024=1984 bits. In Table 2, we have presented several 
security functionalities comparison of the proposed scheme with other relevant schemes [13, 14, 15] and it is 
noticeable that the proposed scheme is secure against relevant security attacks than other schemes.  
 
Fig1: Performance Comparison: Communication Cost  
 
 
 
 
Table1: Performance Comparison: Communication cost and Computation cost 
 
0
2000
4000
Communication Cost
Communication Cost
Performance Comparison He et al.[13] Pippal et al.[14] Wen et al.[15] Proposed Scheme 
Communication Cost 1024*2+160*5 =2848 1024*2+160*3= 2528 1024+512*2+160=2208 160*6+1024=1984 
Computation Cost of Login 
Phase 
2݄ܶ +ʹ ܶܧ 1݄ܶ +ʹ ܶܧ 2݄ܶ +͵ ܶܧ 5݄ܶ +2 ܶܧ 
Computation Cost of 
Authentication Phase 
3݄ܶ +Ͷ ܶܧ 6݄ܶ +5 ܶܧ 3݄ܶ +5 ܶܧ 11݄ܶ +ͳ ܶܧ 
Total Computational Cost 5݄ܶ +͸ ܶܧ 7݄ܶ +7 ܶܧ 5݄ܶ +ͺ ܶܧ 16݄ܶ +͵ ܶܧ 
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 Table 2: Security Features Comparison 
 
  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have discussed a secure and effective remote user authentication scheme using smart card which 
achieves mutual authentication and user anonymity properties. In our scheme, the computational cost and 
communicational cost are relatively low as compared to the important related schemes. Furthermore, the user can 
always change his password correctly and locally at any time without contacting the server. In addition, we have 
demonstrated the validity of our scheme through the BAN logic. Finally, in our scheme after successful 
authentication, a symmetric session key is established between a user and the server so that we can use this key for 
future secure communication. 
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Security Requirement He et al. [13] Pippal et al. [14] Wen et al. [15] Proposed Scheme 
Resist Password Guessing Attack Yes No No Yes 
Resist Replay Attack Yes No Yes Yes 
Resist Impersonation Attack No No No Yes 
Resist Denial of Service Attack Yes No No Yes 
Resist Forward Secrecy Attack Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Resist Insider Attack Yes No Yes Yes 
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